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Social Media and Workers’ Rights: What Is at
Stake?
Riccardo DEL PUNTA*
This article addresses the way in which the growing use of social media is changing the employment
relationship. Technology has given rise to a huge increase in the amount of information about
employees available to employers, while allowing them to engage in invasive monitoring of
employee access to the internet and social media. This highlights the importance of regulatory
techniques, as employees have become more exposed to monitoring by the employer and potentially
to discrimination. In certain cases, the employee’s freedom of expression is at risk. To counteract
these tendencies, privacy laws, recently reinforced in the EU by the General Data Protection
Regulation or GDPR, and more generally the principle of proportionality, can represent effective
instruments to prevent technology from exacerbating the condition of subordination of employees.
1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
As a labour lawyer who grew up in the pre-Social Media era, in approaching the
topic of social media and workers’ rights, I might be tempted to argue that despite
appearances there is nothing really new under the sun. At first glance, this
assumption might seem to be well founded. In fact, the question of free speech
in the workplace and its limitations, that has attracted increasing attention with the
rise in the number of cases of employees being fired for using Facebook or other
social media, is anything but new. It may be said that in the past while public
criticism of the employer could be made by giving an interview to newspapers or
speaking in public, it can still be made today by posting a comment on Facebook
or Twitter. At the same time, the question of the relevance of the private
behaviour of the employee in relation to the employment contract, as a possible
justification for disciplinary dismissal, cannot be said to be original.
Another aspect of the topic under examination concerns the question of
whether and to what extent the employer can openly access the employee’s
personal information posted on social media, once again forming part of a broader
and long-standing debate concerning technological monitoring of employees, in
search of a balance that has yet to be struck between the employers’ prerogatives
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and the employees’ rights to privacy. Incidentally, this debate has been relaunched
within the EU with the entry into force of the GDPR.1
In other words, it may seem on the one hand that the issues raised by employees
posting comments on social media could be managed using the criteria already laid
down by legislation and further elaborated by the courts. On the other hand, the
question of employers monitoring their employees on social networks could be seen
as just one of the many facets of the Big Brother debate currently underway.
However, a serious intellectual conservatism would be evident in the event of a
failure to see that the astonishing success of social media, and as a result the massive
use of such media by employees (inside and outside the workplace), is giving rise to
an information revolution at work, determining an exponential increase in both the
amount and quality of information that circulates around employment (i.e., both in
job applications and in the development of the employment relationship).
It is impossible to pretend that the world of employment can be insulated
from this overwhelming mass of information. Rather, the problem is how, and
according to what kind of balancing with workers’ rights (naturally including
privacy but also other types of freedom that are at the heart of the personal sphere
of the worker), it should be managed by the employer.
In this perspective, the increasing penetration of social media in the workplace
becomes one of the many aspects of the ongoing transformation of work driven by
IT, with which labour law regulations have difficulty keeping pace. In addition,
from a more technical perspective, the topic under discussion, like any IT topic,
poses intrinsic challenges to regulation, that has to cope with an elusive reality. The
chances of implementing effective regulations are thus limited.
Against this backdrop, this article is structured as follows: section 2 examines
the European legal framework concerning the protection of personal data and its
essential difference from the American model, albeit in broad terms; sections 3 and
4 address the investigation of employees by means of social networks and mon-
itoring of their access to social media, leading to an examination of the issue of
dismissals arising from the social media activities of employees (section 5); finally,
section 6 puts forward some concluding remarks.
2 THE EUROPEAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON PRIVACY
The use of social media by employees for private purposes2 immediately evokes
the question of the respect of their privacy in the specific context of the
1 For more details, see infra.
2 The use of social media by employees is considered here exclusively when it is of a private nature
(regardless of whether or not it occurs via use of a computer provided by the employer and during or
outside working hours). Access to social media for work reasons (which is more and more frequent,
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employment relationship. As argued below,3 in relation to this not everything can
be solved by means of privacy, though it remains the first and preliminary frontier
to be defended. The term ‘preliminary’ is used here in a strictly legal sense, as a
source of preliminary issues between the parties in legal proceedings.
Whatever the definition of privacy adopted, either (in the negative) as a mere
restriction of others’ knowledge about oneself, or (in the affirmative) as having
control over information about ourselves,4 the fact remains that privacy defines the
boundaries of legitimate knowledge of personal information or data. As a result, if
such data have come into the possession of others in violation of data protection
regulations, they will have no legal relevance in proceedings, as evidence of certain
types of conduct on which disciplinary dismissals have been based. This is not just
the logical implication of privacy as a right, that I will discuss below, but also a
consequence explicitly provided by some legal systems.5
However, from an EU perspective, the status of the right to protection of
personal data has been consolidated over the years. In fact, this is a fundamental
right, as stated both by Article 8(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, and Article 16(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union. These additional safeguards come in the wake of Directive 95/
46/EC that paved the way for specific legislation enacted by the Member States.
This Directive has been replaced, since 25 May 2018, by Regulation (EU) 2016/
679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016, which
provided the new GDPR.
It is worth noting that as it is contained in a Regulation, capable of both direct
and horizontal effects in the national systems, the GDPR has taken effect in the
Member States, although they are also allowed to adopt national legislation in
order to specify or further implement the EU rules.6 As a result, each national law
will result from a (complex) mix of European and domestic regulations.
This is not the place for examining the numerous rules provided by the
Regulation with regard to the processing of personal data, which amount, in
general terms, to a modernization and further strengthening of privacy protection
(e.g. with an improvement in information procedures and a restriction on the use
of the data subject’s consent as a basis for data processing).
e.g. for marketing purposes) remains outside the focus of this analysis. On this subject, see A. Ingrao, Il
controllo a distanza realizzato mediante Social network, 2(1) Lab. L. Issues 115–117 (2016).
3 See especially s. 5.
4 See V. Mantouvalou, Human Rights and Unfair Dismissal: Private Acts in Public Spaces, 71(6) Mod. L.
Rev. 924 (2008), while discussing Charles Fried’s classical conception, as expressed in ‘Privacy’,
Philosophical Dimensions.
5 See for instance, Art. 2-decies of the Italian Legislative Decree no. 101/2018, n. 6 infra.
6 In Italy this regulation was implemented with Legislative Decree no. 101/2018.
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Suffice it to mention the main principles, as stated in Article 6(1), according to
which personal data must be processed:
Personal data shall be: (a) processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner
in relation to the data subject (‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency’); (b) collected for
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner
that is incompatible with those purposes … (‘purpose limitation’); (c) adequate,
relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which
they are processed (‘data minimisation’); (d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up
to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that personal data that are
inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for which they are processed, are erased
or rectified without delay (‘accuracy’).
Neither the previous Directive nor the GDPR contains specific provisions about
privacy protection in employment. However, Article 88 of GDPR establishes that:
Member States may, by law or by collective agreements, provide for more
specific rules to ensure the protection of the rights and freedoms in respect of the
processing of employees’ personal data in the employment context, in particular for
the purposes of the recruitment, the performance of the contract of employment,
including discharge of obligations laid down by law or by collective agreements,
management, planning and organization of work, equality and diversity in the
workplace, health and safety at work, protection of employer’s or customer’s
property and for the purposes of the exercise and enjoyment, on an individual or
collective basis, of rights and benefits related to employment, and for the purpose
of the termination of the employment relationship.
In any case, the application of privacy protections to employment relationships
is undisputed in the EU area, and a number of regulations concerning privacy in
the workplace have been adopted at various levels by the Member States.
The European framework is completed, on a broader scale than the EU,7 by
the European Convention of Human Rights, adopted by the Council of Europe,
Article 8(1) of which states that ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence’.
On several occasions, as reaffirmed once again in Barbulescu v. Romania (see
below), the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter, ECtHR) has ruled
that the concept of ‘private life’ includes ‘professional activities’ and that employ-
ment relationships falls within the scope of the above-mentioned Article 8.
In the end, the point to be underlined is that under the European rules the
worker is also considered a full citizen in the workplace (however defined), since,
to quote Article 2 of the Italian Constitution, the citizen’s fundamental rights must
also be safeguarded within the ‘social formations’ in which the individual’s
7 Forty-seven Member States, compared to the twenty-eight EU Member States prior to Brexit.
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personality is developed. As a result, employees can legitimately expect respect for
their privacy by the employer, although that right – as clarified in the preamble to
the EU Regulation – is not absolute and must be balanced against the employer’s
prerogatives.
The European approach to privacy therefore continues to be quite different
from that of the US, according to which, with the exception of some piecemeal
legislation adopted by certain states,8 workers do not have any expectation of
privacy. The arguments put forward by Matthew Finkin, proposing a substantial
change in American legislation also on the basis of the European models such as the
German one,9 can be likened to kicking down an open door with reference to the
European context.
The trans-Atlantic divide on this matter has been described in terms of a clash
between the European safeguarding of dignity and the American priority for
liberty, which prevents the US from imposing privacy constraints on
entrepreneurs.10 However, the EU Regulation also takes employer freedom into
consideration to a significant extent, e.g. widely exempting them, while pursuing a
‘legitimate interest’11 (an expression which unquestionably includes the employer’s
interests), from the rule according to which the processing of personal data is only
lawful with the consent of the data subject.12
It is nonetheless true that a profound gap remains between the two sides of the
Atlantic on this issue (with the UK, as always, in the middle). The idea that the
employees’ freedom to express their personality in the workplace, for which the
guarantee of a certain degree of privacy is indispensable, is also worth safeguarding,
continues to be largely extraneous to the mainstream American culture, despite
minority opinions drawing attention to the additional challenges posed by new
technologies.13 In this sense a contradiction emerges with the well-known
8 See M. W. Finkin, R. Krause & H. Takeuchi-Okuno, Employee Autonomy, Privacy, and Dignity Under
Technological Oversight, in Comparative Labour Law 164–165 (M. W. Finkin & G. Mundlak eds,
Cheltenham UK – Northampton MA, Edward Elgar Publishing 2017).
9 See M. W. Finkin, Some Further Thoughts on the Usefulness of Comparativeness in the Law of Employee
Privacy, 14 Emp Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 11 (2010). See also M. W. Finkin, Privacy: Its Constitution and
Vicissitudes – A Half Century on, 18 Can. Lab. & Emp. L.J. 349 (2015).
10 See Finkin, Some Further Thoughts, supra n. 9, especially 41 ff. The incommensurability of the American
and European conception of privacy is classically argued by J. Q. Whitman, Two Western Cultures of
Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 Yale L.J. 1151 (2004), whose arguments are extensively discussed
and critiqued by Finkin.
11 See the EU Regulation, in Art. 6(1), according to which the consent rule does not apply when
‘processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a
third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and
freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data
subject is a child’.
12 This exemption does not apply, however, to the processing of so-called ‘sensitive data’.
13 In Finkin’s footsteps, see L. Evans, Monitoring Technology in the American Workplace: Would Adopting
English Privacy Standards Better Balance Employee Privacy and Productivity?, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 1115 (2007).
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American sensitivity to anti-discriminatory protection, as it is evident that privacy
is the first barrier to discrimination, as well as ‘a necessary precondition for
individual autonomy and human flourishing’.14
3 INVESTIGATIONS OF EMPLOYEES THROUGH SOCIAL
NETWORKS
Once it has been established that in the European perspective the employee has a
legitimate, though not absolute, expectation of privacy, the analysis must become
more concrete in order to identify the main legal techniques in the European
systems aimed at protecting this right, with a special focus on employee activity on
social media.
The general premise is that since the Aristotelian unity of space, time and
action traditionally characterizing subordinate work has been broken down by the
advent of teleworking (which also denotes a particular form of subordinate work,
such as smart work), both the spatial and temporal elements of the employment
relationship have become progressively less important, though they are obviously
not obsolete. This leads us to identify the lowest common denominator of the
relationship in terms of the circulation of information which is naturally inherent to
the drafting, conclusion and execution of the employment contract, in proportion
to the intensity of the contact between the two parties.
Naturally, the disclosure of reciprocal information is always partial, as the conduct
of both parties tends to be opportunistic or at least strategic. They usually try to find
out as much as possible about the other party and to disclose as little as possible about
themselves. The resulting asymmetry of information15 has been widely examined in
the economic literature, though usually without considering that what is particular
about the employment relationship is that this asymmetry occurs in a situationwhich is
already characterized by an inequality of power between the parties. Moreover,
especially on the part of the employer, the novelty is that technology has triggered
an ‘inexorable drive’ to know more and more about their employees, in order to
reduce, as far as possible, ‘the zone of the unknown’.16 More information entails even
greater power, but can legislation resist this ‘inexorable drive’?
The relevant regulations are contained in privacy law, as well as in additional
provisions that take account of the asymmetry of power (and not just the asym-
metry of information, as in the economists’ point of view) inherent in the employ-
ment relationship. These regulations are aimed at increasing the overall impact of
14 See Mantouvalou, supra n. 4, at 921.
15 For one of the earlier definitions of ‘asymmetric information’, see L. Philips, The Economics of Imperfect
Information 2 (Cambridge, CUP 1988).
16 See Finkin, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, supra n. 9, at 362.
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protection in a logic of complementarity between privacy and the labour law
perspective.
Let us take an example from Italian labour law. The premise is that Article 8
(1) of the GDPR (as well as the previous Directive) provides for reinforced
protection of so-called ‘sensitive data’, that is:
data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs,
or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the
purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concern-
ing a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation.
The processing of these data is basically prohibited, except in specific circum-
stances that do not interest us here. The rule of consent by the data subject, which
normally amounts to authorization of the processing of data, can be limited here,
in that a Member State may establish that the basic prohibition cannot be lifted by
the data subject. This is the case of the Italian provision referred to above, that
dates back long before the topic of privacy gained great attention, i.e., Article 8,
Act no. 300/1970, which establishes that:
It is forbidden for the employer, both for the hiring process and throughout the employ-
ment relationship, to conduct investigations, also indirectly, of the political and religious
opinions or the trade union affiliations of the employee, or of facts that are not relevant for
the evaluation of his/her occupational capacity.
This article aimed, first of all, at providing an ante litteram (and in this case absolute)
protection of workers’ privacy by preventing the employer from accessing the
sensitive information of the kind considered. In addition, Article 8 was meant ‘to
facilitate the free manifestation of the employee’s personality’ without fear of any
consequences.17 In this anti-domination view, the provision was clearly linked to
anti-discriminatory protection.
However, Article 8 went beyond these goals: by means of the ban on any
investigation of facts ‘not relevant for evaluating the worker’s occupational capa-
city’, it pursued the even more ambitious goal of depersonalization of the employ-
ment relationship.
The basic idea was clear, but it must be noted that this was back in 1970. The
worker made his/her labour and time available to the employer, and was paid for
this, which exhausted the contractual exchange. As a result, not just the worker’s
political or religious opinions, ethnic origin, sexual preferences and so on, but also
the rest of his/her life had to remain beyond the employer’s knowledge and
17 See A. Topo & O. Razzolini, The Boundaries of the Employer’s Power to Control Employees in the ICT Era,
39 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 101 (2018), s. 5.
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evaluation, as though everything regarding the worker’s personal life outside the
workplace was to remain hidden, in a logic aimed at preventing employer abuse.18
In other words, as the legislator was aware of the unbridgeable gap of power
between the employer and the employee, it was held that the only way to defend
the employee was by building a barrier of negative freedom within a relationship
nonetheless based on the legalized interference by one party with the other one.
One problem with provisions such as these, however, has always been that
they are largely ineffective in terms of the employer’s conduct during selection and
recruitment procedures. This is due not only to the fact that any misconduct on
the part of the employer (such as asking a female applicant if she intends to get
married and/or get pregnant in the near future) normally takes place without
witnesses (except when the interview is recorded, in which case the recording
can be accepted as evidence by the courts), but also to the obvious fact that the
employer does not need to provide reasons for rejecting a job application.
This leads us to address the widespread practice of carrying out searches on the
open web, including social network pages that are not subject to privacy restric-
tions, in order to gather information about job applicants with a view to profiling
their personality. Some of the most advanced HR firms are now already using
sophisticated apps and algorithms to sort through job applications and pick the best
candidates.
A growing number of jobseekers are encouraging this trend, as they try to give
a boost to their careers through the web, in some cases to the point of becoming
semi-professional bloggers.19 Some social networks, such as LinkedIn, are expressly
devoted to facilitating new professional contacts: the candidates’ profiles are crucial
in this respect.
It is also important to bear in mind that the concept of ‘occupational skill’
is intrinsically evolving, as growing importance is given to ‘soft skills’ which
include all those attributes, linked to the employee’s personality, that enable
someone to interact effectively and harmoniously with other people. This
practice is often encouraged as it allows for a more comprehensive appraisal
of the worker’s personality, which could be the premise for more complete
individual self-realization at work. However, it also entails risks, as it leads
employers to look for a wider range of data than strictly occupational
18 For a case in which a violation of Art. 8 was detected when an employer had been storing all the
employees’ emails and connections to internet in the workplace as a preventive measure, claiming that
all the stored information could be useful in order to identify employees responsible for any
misconduct, see the Italian Court of Cassation, Labour Section, 19 Sept. 2016, no. 18302.
19 This practice is considered as counter-productive, however, by some minority opinions: see
C. Newport, Quit Social Media. Your Career May Depend on It, www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20
(accessed Nov. 20 2016).
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information, thus eroding or even suppressing the boundaries between the
private and occupational spheres.
Even Public Employment Services have been affected by these methods, at
least those that seek to improve the efficacy of their employability policies, the
importance of which is widely recognized, both at a European (under the flex-
icurity flag)20 and a global21 level. The effective profiling of jobseekers is, in fact,
the premise for calibrating activation measures. In this light, a provision such as the
above-mentioned Article 8 cannot prevent these practices since the concept of
‘relevant’ information is evolving, and in actual fact, because this information is
often at everyone’s disposal on the open web.22
Moreover, in certain cases, employers do not carry out an investigation but
personal information about a worker is spontaneously provided by a third party,
such as another employee. This may take place by reposting comments and
pictures from a different social network, account or discussion board.
That said, undoubtedly the processing of such data falls under the scope of the
more flexible privacy regulations. This will require employers and HR profes-
sionals, as well as employment agencies, headhunters and so on, to state the legal
basis for data processing, retention periods, the data subject’s right of complaint,
and information about individual rights under the GDPR.
However, the impact of this regulation must not be overstated. On the basis of
the GDPR, for example, employers should only be allowed ‘to collect and process
personal data relating to job applicants to the extent that the collection of such data
is necessary and relevant to the performance of the job which is being applied
for’.23 As already noted, the conception of what is relevant to the job is becoming
broader and broader, not to mention the fact that most of this processing occurs
before any face-to-face contact between the parties has taken place, giving the
impression that the vast majority of this microprocessing will continue to elude
privacy protection.
What is easier to answer is the question as to whether the employer is entitled
to ask for the employee’s username or password to access his/her personal social
media accounts. This is a matter of debate also in the US, where, according to
common law, and in the absence of legislation, the request must be considered
legitimate, meaning that the applicant who fails to communicate his/her username
or password would not be hired and, if already employed, could be dismissed.
20 See, most recently, the Fourth European Pillar of Social Rights, concerning the necessity to give
‘active support to employment’.
21 See, for one of the first International Labour Organization statements about the importance of
employability, the Human Resources Development Recommendation, no. 195/2004.
22 This is, instead, the opinion of Topo & Razzolini, supra n. 17, s. 5.
23 See the Opinion of the Working Party set up under Art. 29 of the EU Directive, an independent
advisory body on data protection and privacy.
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However, since 2012, several states have passed legislation to prohibit employers
from making such requests.24
In Germany, even though no specific regulations exist on this matter, it is
commonly acknowledged, by virtue of the Federal Data Protection Act, that ‘there
cannot exist a duty of the applicant to disclose his/her password because this would
inevitably lead to the unveiling of personal data beyond employment-related
purposes’.25 The Italian regulations are clearer in this regard, as they state that
requesting access to an employee’s personal account violates the above-mentioned
Article 8, ‘because it may reveal more than what is necessary for specifically
detecting whether the employee is fit for the job position’.26
The same conclusion could be reached, both for Germany and Italy, also on
the basis of the GDPR, but with the difference that the GDPR gives relevance to
the consent of the data subject, who could therefore be ‘forced’ to disclose the
password. Instead, on the basis of a more rigorous provision such as the Italian
Article 8, the employee’s consent would have no relevance, though this provision
might be violated de facto, due to the worker’s dependence on the job.
4 THE EMPLOYER’S CONTROL OVER EMPLOYEE ACCESS
TO THE INTERNET AND SOCIAL MEDIA
Employees frequently access the internet during working hours for a variety of
reasons, such as taking a break, contacting partners or friends, planning holidays,
booking restaurants, purchasing flights, and even visiting pornographic websites.
The use of social media is only one of the many reasons for access. Employees
access the internet either using their own devices, such as smartphones, or the
computer assigned to them by the employer. In both cases the work activity is
interrupted, which may be tolerated by the employer, within certain limits, or not
tolerated at all, depending on the policy adopted by the firm. Especially in cases in
which they suspect abuse, employers often react by subjecting their employees to
intensive monitoring potentially capable of ensuring the full traceability of their
operations.
Here again the trans-Atlantic divide is evident, as in the US model the
employer’s power of monitoring, through video surveillance systems, geolocation
technology and other computerized systems, is virtually unlimited, apart from
sporadic constraints laid down in the legislation of certain states.27 Instead, the
European regulation has proposed essentially two models over the years that have
24 See Finkin, Krause & Takeuchi-Okuno, supra n. 8, at 182–85.
25 Ibid., at 185–86.
26 See Topo & Razzolini, supra n. 17, s. 5.
27 See Finkin, Krause & Takeuchi-Okuno, supra n. 8, at 188–89.
88 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW
ended up overlapping with each other to a certain extent.28 On the one hand, the
traditional approach is based on the prohibition of direct control of workers via
remote monitoring, and on the other, on the possibility of indirect control, justified
on productive or organizational grounds, provided it is authorized either by the
workers’ representative, through a collective agreement at plant level (as in the case
of Germany, where this is a matter of co-determination, and in Italy), or by an
administrative body (as in the case of Italy).
However, this model raises a number of problems. First, the conceptual
distinction between direct and indirect monitoring has always been spurious
(productive or organizational reasons are often a fig leaf for deliberate monitoring
of employees) and it is increasingly untenable with regard to IT, which potentially
allows for full traceability of all the employee’s operations. Second, it may be the
case that the authorization by the trade unions is given simply in exchange for
concessions from the employer, without having an effective impact on the way the
monitoring is carried out.
The other model, the relevance of which has been increasing over the years
due to the development of a culture of privacy, is centred on privacy protection
rules, since they also act as a constraint on the employer’s power of control, as the
gathering of personal data by means of remote monitoring is recognized as a form
of data processing, and is therefore subject to privacy regulations. However, these
regulations must in turn take account of the fact that they apply to an environment
which is characterized by legitimate prerogatives of one party over the other.
In this respect, the privacy regulation proposes a sort of exchange. On the one
hand, it basically exempts the installation of IT systems that indirectly allow the
monitoring of employees from the need to obtain the individual worker’s consent,
to the extent that such an installation is justified by the employer’s ‘legitimate
interest’ of a productive, organizational or technical nature.
On the other hand, the principles and rules governing privacy are a restraint
on the employer’s power of monitoring, which is not prevented but subjected to
the proportionality criteria. The relevance of the proportionality principle in this
respect is stressed in various European legislations, such as the French one.29
However, the proportionality test is currently applied also by other legal systems.30
With specific reference to the GDPR, proportionality is broken down into
additional, more specific principles. As far as employee access to the internet and
28 For an analysis of this regulation from an Italian perspective, see Ingrao, supra n. 2; Topo & Razzolini,
supra n. 17.
29 See the Code du travail, Art. L. 1121-1.
30 See G. Davidov, A Purposive Approach to Labour Law 184–87 (Oxford, OUP 2016), with examples
taken from Canada, Israel, and UK (where proportionality has been brought into the analysis by means
of the above-mentioned Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights).
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social media is concerned, the principle of ‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency’
requires the employer to adopt a fairness and transparency policy that gives workers
adequate information on how their data are processed, and how they can be
subject to inspections. Then the principle of ‘purpose limitation’ requires the speci-
fying of the purposes of data processing and limits the processing to the pursuit of
those purposes. At the same time, the principle of ‘data minimization’ requires
employers to adopt preventive measures before checking workers (e.g. installing
software blocking access to sites that are extraneous to work activity), to mitigate
the intensity of monitoring, which must not be continuous or pervasive, and
anonymize the data as far as possible (as allowed by specific software), where
necessary with the exception of cases in which significant anomalies in worker
performance emerge. The actual circumstances of each case must also be taken into
account: e.g. in the event of specific reasons for suspecting a certain worker, the
proportionality principle should lead to acceptance of more intrusive monitoring,
at least temporarily.
This regulation allows an employee who has been dismissed for disciplinary
reasons on the basis of information gathered by means of remote monitoring to
challenge the dismissal before a court by alleging that the evidence of his/her
misconduct was unlawfully collected, and, therefore, not admissible in the
proceedings.31
By way of example, this position was expressly laid down by the recent Italian
reform of the rules concerning remote monitoring of employees,32 which estab-
lished that data collected via remote monitoring can be used ‘for all purposes
inherent to the employment relationship’ (including disciplinary purposes, but also
the evaluation of worker performance) provided that the workers have been
adequately informed about the firm’s policy on the use of electronic devices and
that data collection has been carried out in compliance with the privacy
regulations.
The importance of adopting a transparency policy, by virtue of which the
worker is required to be informed in advance on how to use the firm’s equipment
and about the possibility of monitoring, was also stressed by the ECtHR in the
interpretation of above-mentioned Article 8 of the European Convention of
Human Rights. This particular case was referred to the Court by Mr Barbulescu,
who was employed as a sales engineer at the Bucharest office of a Romanian
31 In this respect, the conclusion reached by the Italian Court of Cassation, Labour Section, 15 June
2017, no. 14682, according to which the data concerning the time and amount of the employee’s
connections to internet during working time does not constitute personal data, so that the employer’s
non-compliance with the duty of prior information was not considered relevant, seems to be
oversimplified.
32 See the Legislative Decree no. 151/2015, which I analysed in R. Del Punta, La nuova disciplina dei
controlli a distanza sul lavoro, Riv. it. dir. lav. 77, I (2016).
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company. At his employer’s request, in order to respond to customer enquiries, he
set up an instant messaging account using Yahoo Messenger, an online chat service
offering real-time text transmission over the internet. The employee had been
informed of the prohibition on using the computer for personal reasons, but not
explicitly about the possibility of monitoring by the employer.
In 2007, Mr Barbulescu was summoned by his employer to explain why,
during a certain week, his internet activity had been much greater than that of his
colleagues. At that stage, he had not been informed about whether the monitoring
of his communications also concerned the content. Consequently, the employee
told the employer that he had used Yahoo Messenger for work-related purposes
only. Unfortunately, this was not true, as the company was well aware right from
the start. As a result, the firm terminated his employment contract and the
employee challenged the dismissal before the Romanian court, but unsuccessfully.
The judgment was then brought before the ECtHR, based on the alleged violation
of Mr Barbulescu’s right to privacy.
The Court’s reasoning was tormented. In the first stages the Chamber held
that there had been no violation, in the specific circumstances, of Article 8 of the
Convention.33 This decision was overturned, albeit with a significant dissenting
opinion, by the Grand Chamber34 which essentially reproached the Romanian
Court of Appeal for neglecting a number of elements that should have been taken
into consideration in order to evaluate whether a fair balance had been struck
between the two interests at stake. In other words, according to the ECtHR, the
Court of Appeal
failed to determine whether the applicant had received prior notice from his employer of
the possibility that his communications on Yahoo Messenger might be monitored; nor did
they consider the fact that he had not been informed about the nature or extent of this
monitoring, or the degree of intrusion into his private life and correspondence. In
addition, they failed to determine, firstly, the specific reasons justifying the introduction
of the monitoring measures; secondly, whether the employer could have used measures
entailing less intrusion into the applicant’s private life and correspondence; and thirdly,
whether the communications might have been assessed without his knowledge.35
These are, substantially, the same principles underlying the GDPR. This allows us
to speak of a common European approach, by virtue of which the potential
contradiction between the employer’s power of monitoring, inherent in the
condition of subordination, and the employee’s expectation of privacy in the
workplace, is handled, although not entirely resolved, by means of a number of
principles which can be summarized by the idea that monitoring must be carried
33 See ECtHR, IV Section, 12 Jan. 2016, Barbulescu v. Romania.
34 See ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 5 Sept. 2017, Barbulescu v. Romania.
35 See Ibid.
SOCIAL MEDIA AND WORKERS’ RIGHTS 91
out both transparently and proportionally, taking into account all the specific
circumstances.
However, transparency cannot mean that the employee needs to be informed
prior to any particular monitoring action, as it is obvious that this would make it
useless, giving the employee time to conceal at least the most evident proof of his/
her misconduct (even though electronic evidence can usually be recovered by the
server). Transparency must basically be intended in terms of prior knowledge of
the possibility of monitoring, even if not continuous or intrusive.
In the end, the essential action that firms are required to carry out under the
law in force is to draw up a privacy policy that ensures in an approximate manner
that they are able to deal at least with the most serious acts of misconduct by the
employees, while also preventing the employer from resorting to massive and
continuous monitoring of the workforce.
This compromise seems to be the best possible solution in view of the
balancing of the two interests, both legitimate, that are at stake, and each of
which must give up its original claim to be absolute. However, the intrinsic
uncertainty of the regulation, which is mostly (and inevitably) based on open
principles rather than on precise prescriptions, is still a problem. It is never easy
to clearly establish in advance, for either party, the boundary between what is
allowed and what is forbidden, e.g. the point beyond which monitoring
becomes excessive and intrusive with regard to the privacy of the other
party. This is an argument in favour of a second-level regulation with more
specific guidelines and prescriptions, such as those issued by data protection
authorities.
It is hard to say whether this is a sufficient barrier for avoiding the degenera-
tion of management control into a Big Brother or, even more classically, a
Panopticon scenario, which has become a matter of concern even for The
Economist, a champion of free enterprise, leading it to invoke transparent monitor-
ing (‘tracking the trackers’) inspired by ‘a strong dose of humanity’, also consider-
ing that ‘a more productive workforce is a prize worth having, but not if it shackles
and dehumanises employees’.36
Finally, I would like to address a highly unusual case, that has to do with
Facebook but shows how the monitoring of the employee’s use of social media
does not necessarily focus on the use of the employer’s device. In this case an
imaginative form of monitoring was devised to collect evidence that the employee
frequently abandoned the workstation to chat on Facebook, thus leaving a danger-
ous press-machine unsupervised. The employer asked the HR manager to set up a
fake female profile to induce the employee to chat using his own device during
36 See the leader Workplace of the Future, The Economist, 31 Mar. 2018.
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work time. The employee fell into the trap and once the evidence was collected
(added to which, the press-machine jammed while the chatting was taking place),
he was dismissed for just cause.
The Italian Court of Cassation argued that the evidence of misconduct had
been lawfully collected by the employer, in that it was aimed at protecting the
company’s property.37 As for the fact that the misconduct had not only been
discovered but induced by an agent provocateur, purposely set up by the
employer, the Court, unbelievably, did not detect any violation of the good
faith principle.
5 FIRED FOR FACEBOOK
It has been argued that the social media environment is some kind of ‘inter-reality’
or hybrid reality, deriving from the merging and interaction of the digital and real
world.38 However, it may be the case that the real world takes its revenge in the
very tangible form of a letter of dismissal for disciplinary reasons. Cases of employ-
ees fired because of their use of Facebook or other social media have become
widespread worldwide, causing various reactions among the public and giving rise
to delicate issues. These actually involve two situations, which must be addressed
separately, due to their different legal implications.
The easier cases concern ‘cyberslacking’, in which the employee is alleged to
have used the internet for personal reasons during working time (irrespective of
whether it was with personal or company devices). This practice, that has been
made easier with the advent of broadband internet connections, is estimated to
have a high cost for employers in terms of lost productivity, additional security
costs, and staff replacement. These situations often end up in dismissal on disci-
plinary grounds, thus giving rise to two distinct issues. The first one, which
concerns the lawfulness of the data processing, has already been dealt with.39
The second one concerns whether a breach of contract has occurred, and its
seriousness.
In these circumstances, there is usually some form of violation of contractual
duties. However, it may be the case that the firm has a policy of tolerating short
work breaks. What is intriguing is the case of employees engaged in ‘smart work-
ing’, with regard to whom there is a need to ascertain whether the time lost on the
internet was justified by their right to be disconnected with the employer after
37 See Court of Cassation, Labour Section, 27 May 2015, no. 10955.
38 See J. van Kokswijk, Hum@n, Telecoms & Internet as Interface to Inter-Reality (Hoogwoud, Berboek
2003); G. Riva, I social network, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2016, 106ff.
39 See s. 4.
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their work time, which has been upheld, albeit in various forms and still experi-
mentally, by both French and Italian legislations.40
In this connection, it is more important to assess the seriousness of the
breach, which depends on the criteria adopted in the different legal systems for
defining the justified reason for dismissal. In this case, too, the guiding principle
is that of proportionality, which involves all the facts of the case (duration and
reiteration of the abuse, contents and transparency of the firm’s policy, any
tolerated bad practices) that have to be taken into account to establish whether
the measure of dismissal was proportionate to the employee’s infringement. The
kind of websites visited, which may include social media, should not be relevant
in this perspective, as long that they have nothing to do with the job. One
example is the case of a French employee who tweeted during working time
using the firm’s smartphone, and the judge ruled that dismissal was unfair because
four tweets a day can be tolerated by the employer as each of them takes only
about one minute.41
The other and far more delicate problem concerns employees who are
dismissed because of opinions or other expressions (through texts, videos, pictures)
openly shared with a virtual community on the social media. I am mainly referring
to the case of opinions posted on social media without any privacy settings.
However, even if the opinion is shared with a limited number of friends but has
nevertheless circulated on the web, it could still be relevant.
The most common situation concerns public criticism of the employer
expressed by employees, often in vulgar terms. In principle, these cases do not
entail a different approach from the one adopted in evaluating other situations, not
related to social media, in which the worker makes a criticism in an open letter or
speaking before a wide audience.42
On the one hand, the employee’s freedom of expression is at stake, which
cannot be suppressed in consideration of the duty of loyalty to the employer which
is inherent to subordination. However, the right of criticism must be exer-
cised – again – in respect of proportionality, which entails taking account of
circumstances such as the truthfulness or the plausibility of the comments made,
the context in which the opinions have been expressed (e.g. a union dispute can
allow for more vehement criticism), the size of the audience (in our case a virtual
40 As for France, see the Loi Travail no. 2016–1988; for Italy, with specific regard to smart workers, Art.
19, para. 1, Law no. 81/2017. For a conceptual analysis from a Spanish perspective, see F. Alemán
Páez, El derecho de desconexiòn digital, Trabajo y Derecho, no. 30, 12 (June 2017). A provision pushing
employers to consult prevention and protection committees and eventually draft agreements with
them on the use of digital work tools, including disconnection, has been introduced in Belgium, by an
Act of 26 Mar. 2018, although unlike the French provision it does not entail a right to disconnect.
41 See M. Degeorges, Tweeter au travail est-il passible de licenciement?, www.LesEchos,fr (6 Mar. 2016).
42 As in the case examined by the Italian Court of Cassation, Labour Section, 29 Nov. 2016, no. 24260.
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community), and the offensive nature of the expressions used43 (not necessarily in
terms of the wording).44 In order to establish that these shifting boundaries have
been overcome, it is not strictly necessary for the employee to be guilty of
defamation.
An Italian Court also considered how quickly the employee removed the
comments from the internet in order to reduce their offensive impact.45 As a
matter of principle, there should be more tolerance with regard to a mere ‘Like’
posted by the employee, as it seems paradoxical that the termination of an
employment relationship can depend on a gesture that may have been purely
emotional, and almost subconscious. In other words, the natural ‘liquidity’ of the
information circulating on the web should be taken into consideration.
Nonetheless, a delicate Italian case shows how a ‘Like’ on Facebook can also
become a reason for dismissal. An Italian prison guard had posted a ‘Like’ to a
comment stressing that too many suicides were taking place in that prison. The
Court ruled that the employee had been lawfully dismissed as the opinion thus
expressed could damage the prison’s reputation.46 It is hard to say how fair this
judgment was: from the outside it seems that instead of focusing just on the
reputational damage, the ruling could have taken into greater consideration the
plausibility or otherwise of the charges.
A short tweet may also damage the employer’s reputation, and as such, justify
a disciplinary dismissal.47 An intermediate situation occurs when offensive expres-
sions are not addressed to the employer but instead to a colleague, regardless of
whether it is during working time or outside work (provided, however, that they
are not linked to strictly private reasons). If the offence is serious, to the point of
constituting harassment, of course it may be a fair reason for dismissal, a fortiori in
consideration of the harm indirectly caused to the organization.48
A link between a certain expression (in this case not in the wording) and
employment may also be connected to special circumstances. An Italian Court
43 For an Italian case in which several employees used disparaging expressions towards the employer that
were repeated outside the workplace, see Court of Cassation, Labour Section, 31 Jan. 2017, no. 2499.
Instead, according to the Tribunal of Busto Arsizio 20 Feb. 2018, telling the employer he is a ‘bastard’
does not overstep the boundaries of legitimate criticism.
44 See Cour d’appel de Reims, Chambre sociale, Arret du 16 novembre 2016, Rép. gen. no. 15/03197,
which regarded as fair the dismissal of an employee who had published a provocative video on
Facebook where he and several colleagues had adhesive tape over their mouths and their hands tied.
45 See Tribunal of Milan, 1 Aug. 2014.
46 See TAR of Lombardia, III Section, 3 Mar. 2016 no. 246, also commented on by Topo & Razzolini,
supra n. 17, s. 6.
47 See Tribunal of Milan, 29 Nov. 2017.
48 Such as Joseph v. TeleTech UK Ltd (2012) NIIT/00704_11IT, in which an employee has been fairly
dismissed due to the posting on Facebook of a sex-related and offensive comments towards a female
colleague. On this decision, see the favourable opinion of M. Pearson, Offensive Expressions and the
Workplace, 43 ILJ 429 (2014).
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upheld as fair the dismissal of an employee who posted a photo of himself online
posing with guns, thus causing concern about safety in the workplace.49 In this
respect, the Court also took into account the fact that an act of violence had been
committed in the firm by the dismissed employee’s brother only a few days before.
In other cases, employees have been dismissed because of their private beha-
viour (personal habits and choices, general opinions on matters of public debate), as
revealed by the employees themselves or by third persons on social media. In
dealing with this topic, and in particular, the delicate cases of two men who had
been dismissed for conduct relating to their sexual life (engaging in homosexual
acts in the toilet of a café in the first case, and the performing of shows in hedonist
and fetish clubs as well as managing a company selling products connected with
extreme sex, in the second), Virginia Mantouvalou convincingly elaborated on the
updating of the concept of privacy.50
In particular, she criticized the decision of the UK court in the first case
mentioned above, according to which an activity occurring in a public place (such
as a café) cannot constitute elements of the employee’s private life. She argued,
instead, that everything the employee does outside the workplace and working
time must basically be considered as private, even when occurring in a public
place. Her conclusion, inspired by the application of the republican concept of
freedom from domination to the employment relationship, is that ‘off-duty con-
duct may lead to lawful termination of employment only if there is a clear and
present impact or a high likelihood of such impact on business interests; a spec-
ulative and marginal danger does not suffice’.51
I agree with these conclusions, which closely correspond with the arguments
currently deployed by European courts in the interpretation of the notion of
justified reason for dismissal. However, I doubt that the concept of privacy can
have sufficient reach in this respect, essentially because privacy has to do with the
control of personal information, so that it has little influence, unless it is over-
burdened, on the ways in which such information is evaluated from other per-
spectives once voluntarily disclosed, as is the case of an employee who is active on
social media.
In other words, even if one believes, in accordance with the European
approach, that privacy at work exists and must represent an initial limitation to
the employer’s power of intrusion in the employees’ lives, both at and outside
work, it must be acknowledged that in those situations in which privacy is de
49 See Tribunal of Bergamo, 24 Dec. 2015.
50 See Mantouvalou, supra n. 4, at 912. The conclusion of the Pay v. UK case, with an ECtHR decision,
has been further commented by H. Collins & V. Mantouvalou, Private Life and Dismissal, 38 ILJ 133
(2009).
51 See Mantouvalou, supra n. 4, at 912.
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facto overcome in one way or the other, a second and even stronger frontier
must be built up, which directly concerns the boundaries of subordination and
the employer’s managerial power with respect to the worker’s personal free-
dom, which would be curtailed in the case that an employee could be dismissed
for exercising it.
My view is quite radical in this regard. Compliance with patterns of moral
behaviour favoured by the employer for some reason (often due to fear of reputa-
tional damage), or generally accepted at least according to mainstream opinion,
cannot be basically considered as an employee’s contractual duty. Otherwise, the
employment relationship would internalize an ethical finalization contrary to the
categorical imperative that labour law has raised in the course of its evolution,
regarding respect for the worker’s individual sphere as such.
This does not rule out the possibility of cases in which private conduct could
justify dismissal, though they need to be marginalized as exceptional, due to the
priority granted to the value of personal freedom, in other words, as I would say in
a Capability Approach perspective, the personal capability of being or doing
whatever one wishes to be or do.
Particular attention must be paid, of course, to those cases in which the
employee’s essential qualities or choices are at stake and come under the category
of anti-discrimination protection (even though some of these cases must be
differently evaluated in ideologically orientated organizations, such as political
parties or religious institutions, where the boundaries of what is permitted to the
employer are somewhat more extensive).
However, the area governed by anti-discrimination legislation does not cover
all cases where the employee’s personal freedom is at stake. The freedom to choose
how to dress or the freedom not to wear make-up – to mention a case discussed by
Finkin,52 though not related to social media – may be as important as the freedom
to express political opinions or sexual preferences.
I am not so concerned about the moralistic obsessions of some individual
employer, as by the large companies’ codes of conduct and practices inspired by
the unwritten law of political correctness, that give me cause for concern in
excessive cases. One of these excessive cases occurs, in my opinion, when the
values rightly protected by anti-discriminatory legislation are paradoxically used
to place disproportionate restrictions on the freedom of opinion and speech,
especially in matters of public debate which are by their very nature
controversial.
This can happen, for example, when employees are dismissed for having
publicly expressed opinions on social media or elsewhere that are not in line
52 See Finkin, Some Further Thoughts, supra n. 9, at 13 ff.
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with mainstream views, on the pretext that they could cause damage to the
employer.
A case brought before the UK High Court is interesting in this respect. A
manager posted a link on his Facebook wall to a news article about gay
marriage, criticizing the fact that ‘people who have no faith and don’t believe
in Christ would want to get hitched in church as the Bible is quite specific that
marriage is for men and women’. Due to these comments, the manager was
demoted to a non-managerial position with a 40% reduction in pay, as a result
of an alleged breach of the Equal Opportunities policy and possible damage to
the reputation of the employer, the Stafford Housing Trust. The conclusion of
the High Court leaves me with some doubt,53 even though it sensibly ruled out
that the manager’s ‘moderate expression of his particular views about gay
marriage in church on his personal Facebook wall at a weekend out of working
hours, could sensibly lead any reasonable reader to think the worst of the
Trust … ’. This was a sufficient argument for justifying the conclusion that
the manager had been unlawfully demoted. However, it is significant that the
Court failed to base its reasoning on the intrinsic value of freedom of expres-
sion as well, which must come first and can only be limited in exceptional
circumstances or in the case of evident excesses. What would have happened,
in other words, if the same opinion had been expressed by the manager in a less
‘moderate’, albeit respectful, manner?
In short, we must not think that freedom of expression is acceptable and must
only be defended when the expressions of opinion are to our liking, or correspond
with what we believe a reasonable and liberal-minded person should think. This
would amount to drawing illiberal and even discriminatory consequences from
anti-discriminatory legislation.
However, I am aware that these options raise delicate and sometimes even
tragic dilemmas. While the excesses of political correctness and social conformism
have been outlined above, in my view giving rise to serious concern, the complex-
ity of this issue must nevertheless be acknowledged.
The fact is that the evolutionary trend of the most advanced societies, and
global society to a certain extent, in combination with the growing use and
importance of the internet, has brought about a dramatic increase in the degree
of social control. This has fuelled a widespread circulation of standards of ‘good
thinking and practice’, which may have a positive influence on the policies of
important social actors, like global enterprises. This may lead them to align
53 See Smith v. Trafford Housing Trust, (2012) EWHC 3221 (Ch). On this decision, see Pearson, supra n.
48.
98 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW
themselves with ethical values such as women’s rights or the struggle against
racism.
It is clear, however, that this can leave more exposed to social reactions all
those who, for one reason or another, do not respect these standards and wish to
express dissenting or provocative views on the web. If these people are employees,
it may be the case that they end up being dismissed. A difficult balance thus needs
to be struck between the increased social control of the internet era (which is not
necessarily the same as a democratic control) and the safeguarding of the funda-
mental (though often disturbing) freedom of expression. This is anything but an
easy task.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In the scenario outlined above, the old anthropological image of the ‘silent
worker’, whose personality remained hidden to the employer, except for the
limited familiarity that could derive from working in the same environment, has
become increasingly obsolete. The astonishing success of social media has expo-
nentially multiplied the amount of information about employees which comes into
the employer’s possession often (but not necessarily) as a result of deliberate
investigation.
This trend is virtually impossible to reverse, since it is fuelled both by employ-
ers, who look forward to obtaining the greatest possible amount of information
about their potential or current employees, and by employees, who see their social
identity as an expansion of their personality and thus as a way of improving their
self-fulfilment.
Apart from the question as to whether this is true or not, that is, if both
personal and social identity are able to overlap so harmoniously, which is not a
given, employees often simply do not consider the fact that while their social
media activities may enable them to improve their career prospects or realize
themselves more completely, in the meantime they become much more exposed
to the employer’s evaluation and reactions, in a word, to the employer’s power.
The enhancement of individual capabilities of expression, which social media
would seem to promote, could result, paradoxically, in a worsening of the employ-
ee’s condition of subordination.
In certain contexts, the employees could even become afraid to express their
opinion on matters of public debate, as was the case decades ago, without any
connection to employment, just because they do not correspond to the dictates of
conformism.
In order to prevent or at least counterbalance these pathologies, a dual line of
defence must be defined, on the one hand based on a strong concept of privacy
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according to the European approach, and on the other, on the restatement of the
priority of the freedom of expression in the broadest possible sense.
I have argued that such rights must be kept conceptually separate, although
they are closely interrelated and can both be justified, in the context of the
employment relationship, on the basis of the value of freedom as non-
domination,54 as they are aimed at reducing the arbitrary nature of the employer’s
power over the employee. The capability approach can also be evoked, since we
are speaking of how wide the areas of substantial freedom can be within the
employment relationship.55 However, the key challenge, or rather fine-tuning
exercise, is the balancing with the employer’s prerogatives, in relation to which
the proportionality principle, as noted with regard to the various aspects of this
topic, can play an essential role, although its application in specific situations is
likely to be problematic and controversial.
Nevertheless, a policy orientation should be clear on the basis of the priority
of the values of the worker’s dignity and freedom. In these conditions, and in a
spirit of mutual respect between the parties, with employers learning to accept that
employees are not military personnel taking order or candidates for brainwashing,
and employees not abusing their new-found freedom, the penetration of social
media into the workplace could result in a reduction of the democratic deficit that
is inherent in subordinate employment and end up being positive on the whole.
It is to be hoped that this is not just wishful thinking. In any case, labour law
should defend the values outlined above as it would be paradoxical if its protections
were bypassed, in the ‘magnificent and progressive destiny’56 of the post-Social
Media era, by a new social paternalism left to the discretion (and often the
hypocrisy) of employers fundamentally worried about the commercial success of
their business. In conclusion, to answer the question in the title of this article,
important values and rights are at stake.
54 On the relevance of the non-domination theory for labour law, see D. Cabrelli & R. Zahn, Theories of
Domination and Labour Law: An Alternative Conception for Intervention? 33 Int’l J. Comp. Lab. L. & Indus.
Rel. 339 (2017).
55 For rich insights into the capability perspective, see The Capability Approach to Labour Law (B. Langille
ed., Oxford, OUP forthcoming).
56 From Giacomo Leopardi, La ginestra, 1836. The Italian poet’s ironic words, which were directed
against his contemporaries’ faith in progress, can be taken as a warning not to lose control of
technologies designed to benefit human beings.
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